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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals misapplied this Court's 
analysis in determining jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act so as to deprive a Utah family of the protection of Utah 
Courts? 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals violated Petitioners1 
constitutional rights to family integrity, to travel and to due 
process of law? 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals violated the purpose of the 
Juvenile Court Act and related statutes? 
DECISION IN COURT OF APPEALS 
The decision in the Court of Appeals is reported at 103 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter was 
entered on March 8, 1989. This Court has jurisdiction to review 
this matter by writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2 (3)(a). 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 870578-CV 
Priority #13 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Constitution of the United States, Amendments 5, 9, and 14; 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1 Sections 7 and 25; 28 U.S.C. 
Section 1738A; Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3a-l(7); Sections 78-45C-
1 et seq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a juvenile court dependency case filed in the Juvenile 
Court for Salt Lake County on August 31, 1987. The petition was 
dismissed on November 18, 1987, by order of the Honorable Franklyn 
B. Matheson. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed in a decision by 
the Honorable Richard C. Davidson on March 8, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves a dispute between Utah parents and the San 
Francisco, California Department of Social Services over the care 
and placement of their newborn infant son, born in Salt Lake City 
on August 24, 1987 (Tr.214-5). Because of financial difficulties, 
the mother left the infant at Holy Cross Hospital for a few days 
after birth (Tr. 15). The Utah Division of Family Services filed 
a dependency petition in the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County, 
and received an Order of Temporary Custody on August 31, 1987, 
placing the child in a temporary shelter home (Tr. 37-40, 41, 356, 
R.l). 
The San Francisco, California Department of Social Services 
filed a similar petition for temporary custody in Juvenile Court 
in San Fransisco on September 4, 1987, falsely alleging that the 
child was in San Francisco, and the Juvenile Court there issued a 
detention order for the Utah infant (Tr.49, 50, 146-8, 153-5, 
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Ex.3). A California social worker appeared in Utah with this 
detention order and removed the baby from the Utah shelter home on 
September 5, 1987 (Tr.49,50,289-91). The Utah petition was 
subsequently dismissed on the ground that California was the more 
appropriate forum in which to litigate this dependency case 
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45C-l and related statutes (Tr.334-338, R.38-44). 
The parents appealed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, in a case of first 
impression, finding that while Utah had "home stateff jurisdiction 
pursuant to the UCCJA, California had "substantial connection" 
jurisdiction, because the mother and the father had lived there 
and the fetus had been "conceived and carried nearlv to term there" 
(103 Utah Adv.Rep.27). 
The Court further held that there exists no preference for 
home state jurisdiction and that it was proper for the Utah court 
to decline to exercise its jurisdiction solely because California 
"had access to the greatest amount of relevant information" and 
thus the best interests of the child were automatically served by 
requiring the Utah parents to travel to California to visit the 
child and contest the matter in court in San Francisco (103 Utah 
Adv.Rep.28). 
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Orme found that 
the proper procedure would have been to stay proceedings pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann.§78-45c-7(5). The proceedings would have been 
stayed until further evidence was available regarding the parents 
and regarding California's basis for continued jurisdiction over 
3 
this Utah infant and his Utah family (103 Utah Adv.Rep.28-29). Both 
the majority opinion and Judge Orme's opinion raise concerns about 
the perjured California court documents and the fact that the 
infant was physically removed from Utah while our court still had 
jurisdiction but opined that subsequent events in the proceedings 
had rendered these objectionable acts unimportant (103 Utah 
Adv.Rep.28 n.l and 29 n.2). 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This is apparently a case of first impression in the United 
States and clearly one of first impression in Utah. A social 
services agency in California initiated a juvenile court case in 
California concerning a newborn infant in Utah after the baby was 
already the subject of a juvenile court proceeding in Utah and 
already in a shelter home in Utah. The social services agency in 
California is the only party to this proceeding who has any 
interest in maintaining this case in the courts of California. Both 
parents reside in Utah and the Utah Department of Social Services 
is of course located in this state. 
The Utah Juvenile Court saw no reason to retain its 
jurisdiction over the parties and the case. Consequently, the 
court left this Utah family with no alternative but to travel to 
California to visit their baby and try to get the child back from 
the California authorities. 
By failing to differentiate this case from the run of the mill 
UCCJA interstate custody dispute between two private contestants, 
the Court of Appeals has warped the intent of the UCCJA and must 
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be reversed. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISUNDERSTOOD AND 
MISINTERPRETED THIS COURT'S BEST INTEREST 
ANALYSIS IN PRIOR UCCJA CASES 
The Court of Appeals correctly argued that the most 
appropriate forum is determined by the best interests of the child. 
The Court then cited the five factors of Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-
7(3) which are used to determine jurisdictional best interests. 
(a) If another state is or recently was the 
childfs home state; 
(b) If another state has a closer connection 
with the child and his family or with the child 
and one or more of the contestants; 
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships is more 
readily available in another state; 
(d) If the parties have agreed on another 
forum which is no less appropriate; and 
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court 
of this state would contravene any of the 
purposes stated in section 78-45c-l. 
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did a cursory and sloppy 
analysis of the five factors as they relate to jurisdiction of 
California and Utah over W.D., the infant. The Court concluded 
that Utah "may be11 the home state of the child, but that the Court 
"need not decide that issue." Such a failure to determine the 
child1s home state is unhelpful in serving the best interests of 
the child. 
In any event, California did not meet the home state 
requirement at the time of the commencement of the proceeding. 
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Furthermore, Californiafs connections with the infant after its 
birth were the result of misstatement and misconduct and therefore 
such connections should not be judicially cognizable: 
[W]e cannot condone the manner in which W.D. 
was taken to California before Judge Matheson 
declined jurisdiction nor the misstatement of 
information contained in the California 
petition. 
(103 Utah Adv.Rep.28, n.3) See Tr. 49, 50, 146-8, 153-5, 289-
91. 
Despite such a showing of bad faith and misrepresentation on 
the part of the California petitioner, the Utah Court of Appeals 
inappropriately approved Utahfs deferring of jurisdiction to 
California thereby failing to apply both the Utah and the 
California unclean hands provision: 
If the petitioner for an initial decree has 
wrongfully taken the child from another state 
or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct 
the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction 
for purposes of adjudication of custody if this 
is just and proper under the circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-8(l). 
The Court failed to correctly apply the first prong of the 
substantial connection test which is "the child and his parents, 
or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant 
connection with this state," Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)(b)(i) 
(emphasis added). While the parents may have had significant 
connections to California prior to their move, the child had no 
significant connections to California. Further, the child had 
never been in California until California authorities removed the 
child from his parents and took him to California. 
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The Court inappropriately suggested that the location of the 
fetus during conception and pregnancy provides a substantial 
connection to California. (103 Utah Adv.Rep 27) The language of 
the UCCJA suggests that the location of the fetus during conception 
and pregnancy is not significant for determination of home state. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-2(5). This statutory language plus common 
sense suggests a logical conclusion that the location of the fetus 
during conception and pregnancy is not a significant connection for 
the child once that child is born. Without the childfs significant 
connection to the state of California, the question of the parents1 
significant connection cannot be reached. 
Because the Court failed to apply the first step of the 
substantial connection analysis, it improperly reached the second 
step of the analysis regarding substantial evidence. 
Once the Court improperly reached the second prong of the 
substantial connection test, it then incorrectly applied that test. 
The second prong requires there to be "substantial evidence 
concerning the childfs present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships;" Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l) 
(1987); Cal. Civil Code §5152 (West 1983) (emphasis added). The 
Court overlooked the requirement that suih evidence must pertain 
to present or future care. Instead, the Court looked to old 
information the California authorities had regarding Mthe parents1 
mode of living, psychological makeup, marital relationship, 
parenting skills, and past interrelationship with W. D.'s older 
sister.M (103 Utah Adv.Rep. 27) (emphasis added). The Court did 
not show how such evidence was relevant to the child's present or 
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future care. In fact, this evidence was gathered to describe the 
child's sister's past care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships. Information regarding the child's sister's welfare 
is beyond the Court's purview. 
The Court also failed to correctly apply the significant 
connection and substantial evidence test as it related to Utah's 
jurisdiction over the child. 
The child was born in Utah. Utah was the only state the child 
lived in until the California authorities took the child. The 
mother lived in Utah and intended to continue to live in Utah with 
her child. Additionally, the child's father moved to Utah shortly 
after the child's birth. He also intended to find work and 
continue to live in Utah with the child. Therefore, the child as 
well as both his parents have significant connections to the state 
of Utah, thus satisfying the first prong of the substantial 
connection test. 
The Court also failed to correctly apply the second prong of 
the test to Utah. Because both the mother and the father intended 
to continue to live in Utah with the child and because they 
intended to keep the child and care for him in Utah, all evidence 
concerning the child's present and future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships was in Utah. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals misconstrued the 
definitional section of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act (PKPA). Without analysis the court concluded that "The PKPA 
does not apply to child neglect and dependency proceedings"(103 
Utah Adv.Rep.28 n.l). 
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In a footnote and without any analysis, the court made an 
important policy decision which has the effect of nullifying the 
application of a federal law to Utah. 
A more thorough analysis of the PKPA and its language would 
likely lead to the opposite conclusion, as the Arizona Court of 
Appeals held in Matter of Pima County Juvenile Action. 147 
Ariz.527, 711 P.2d 1200,1206 (1985). This Court needs to consider 
the applicability of PKPA to cases like this one and provide 
guidance to lower courts on this subject. Likewise if this Court 
were to interpret PKPA as applying here, the mode of analysis 
concerning the exercise of jurisdiction between one state with home 
state jurisdiction and another with significant connection 
jurisdiction would always be resolved in favor of the home state, 
a result directly contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals 
in the present case. 
POINT II 
APPLICATION OF THE UCCJA TO REMOVE A UTAH 
CHILD FROM THE STATE AND HIS UTAH FAMILY VIOLATES 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE UTAH 
AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS TO 
FAMILY INTEGRITY AND TO TRAVEL. 
The Court of Appeals in its decision repeatedly castigates the 
baby's mother for moving to Utah, decrying this as "shop[ping] for 
jurisdictionff, 103 Utah Adv.Rep.28. This analysis, based at best 
on a very selective reading of the record, also establishes a 
dangerous precedent. Are new residents of the state of Utah somehow 
second class citizens who are not entitled to full protection of 
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the courts of this state? Again this analysis is half-baked and has 
the potential of setting in motion a series of unwanted results in 
later cases which this Court should stop here. 
This is particularly true where this partial analysis 
contravenes a right protected by the Utah and U.S. Constitutions-
-the right to travel. This right has been recognized by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Guest, 314 U.S.160 (1966) among 
other cases and, based on our state constitution, in City of Salina 
v. Wisden. 737 P.2d 981,983 (Utah 1987). 
Making this decision even more egregious is the conclusion 
that some Utah citizens are not entitled to the protection of our 
courts, contrary to the policy enumerated in state statute and case 
law that ,fthe jurisdiction of our courts should be extended to 
protect the citizens of this State consistent with concepts of 
fairness and equal justice under due process of law.11 Union Ski 
Company v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257,1259 (Utah 1976). 
It seems ironic that a citizen of Utah damaged by a defamatory 
telephone conversation initiated outside Utah can assert 
jurisdiction in Utah, Berrett v. Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest, 
623 F. Supp. 946 (D.Utah 1985), but that Utah parents deprived of 
the custody of their child cannot litigate the matter in a Utah 
court. 
The situation created by the Court of Appeals1 decision is 
more than ironic—it offends the sanctity of the family long since 
recognized by this court. In In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364, 1372,1377 
(Utah 1982), this Court found that a parent has a fundamental 
right, protected by the Constitution, to sustain his relationship 
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with his child• The Court also found an "inherent and retained 
right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child 
under Article I,§7 and §25 cmd that the United States Constitution 
recognizes and protects the same right under the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments." 
The J.P. case is about termination of a parentfs rights. That 
is not the case here. But sanctioning the removal of a twelve-day 
old infant from the state and then telling the parents that 
visitation and further litigation will take place in California is 
just as drastic as termination. Certainly there is no way for a low 
income family to bond with a baby in a shelter home in another 
state; there is no way to feed the child or engage in the labor and 
joy of assisting in the childfs development and training. At the 
least, retaining jurisdiction in Utah would be necessary to 
effectuate state policy as articulated in the J.P. case and in the 
Juvenile Court Act, Utah Code Ann.§78-3a-l(7), to "attempt to 
preserve and strengthen family ties where possible." 
The Court of Appeals1 ruling sanctions a state-sponsored 
severing of family ties and gives the state carte blanche to 
disrupt family life. This important policy revision, again made 
without full analysis and in disregard of this Court's earlier 
cases should be reviewed and corrected by this Court. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PROTECT PETITIONERS9 DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS BY ALLOWING THE CALIFORNIA COURT TO TAKE 
JURISDICTION IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA LAW AND DUE 
PROCESS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case essentially 
states that the Utah courts must decline jurisdiction in UCCJA 
cases regardless of the manner in which the other state handles the 
case and whether or not the other state's actions are taken in 
accordance with the UCCJA, due process and principles of fairness. 
Again because this is a case of first impression, the Court of 
Appeals needs guidance from this Court. If this were a modification 
case, an initial inquiry would be whether the court of the other 
state "assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions 
substantially in accordance with this act...,w Utah Code Ann.§78-
45c-13. The same type of analysis is needed here before the Utah 
court chooses to decline jurisdiction. 
Even a superficial analysis would disclose that the California 
proceedings were defective. A partial list of horrors is as 
follows; the petition failed to comply with California law 
regarding information about the child's whereabouts; the telephone 
notice to the mother in Salt Lake City at 4:00 p.m. of a detention 
hearing in San Francisco the next morning was woefully inadequate; 
and the California court failed to communicate with the Utah court 
even after being apprised of the UCCJA requirement to do so. Yet, 
under the Court of Appeals analysis, none of these problems need 
be remedied and Utah must forego the resolution of this case and 
the protection of its citizens to somehow comply with a very odd 
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view of the UCCJA. 
This Court should review this case to determine the proper 
remedy for failure to comply with the UCCJA, the PKPA or due 
process by a state competing with Utah for UCCJA jurisdiction. 
Finally, this is a contest between Utah parents and a 
California social services agency. None of the policy 
considerations that form the backdrop of the UCCJA and the PKPA 
apply here, or if they do, they should be applied against San 
Francisco Social Services. In a "normal" custody case, two 
contestants with an interest in obtaining Custody of the child are 
situated in different states. The rules of the UCCJA and PKPA are 
designed to facilitate the determination of custody. But here, the 
only basis for the Juvenile Court of California taking custody is 
if there is an emergency that requires action concerning a child 
in California. There is no such child. When California began its 
case and even when the social worker picked up the baby in Utah, 
he was in a shelter home under the care of the Utah Social Services 
Department. 
California's emergency jurisdiction should have only continued 
until the proper home state could be determined and then 
arrangements should have been made to have all further custody 
determinations rendered in the home state. There can be no question 
that the home state is and was Utah. But to allow California to 
continue to make custody placements and orders long after any 
emergency has expired again flaunts the purpose of the UCCJA and 
again incorrectly decides a question of first impression in this 
state. 
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Many other courts, in considering the emergency provisions of 
the UCCJA, similar to Utah Code Ann. §78-45c~3(l)(c), have found 
that the state in which the emergency occurs has jurisdiction only 
long enough to deal with the emergency. See E.P. v. District Court 
of Garfield County. 696 P.2d 254, 262, 263 (Colo. 1985). California 
should have never taken jurisdiction in this case in the first 
place or, at the least, should have returned the matter and the 
child to Utah as soon as the child was in shelter and there was no 
longer any emergency. Utah should not have removed itself from 
resolving the question of custody but should have kept jurisdiction 
of the matter all along. Such a procedure was incorrect and should 
be reversed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should take this opportunity to correct the 
numerous analytical errors in the Court of Appeal's decision and 
provide guidance to lower courts regarding the correct 
interpretation of the UCCJA to protect the rights of Utah citizens 
to use the Courts of this state to protect their rights. The 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted. 
DATED this _ 7 ^ d a y of /4h)V) / , 1989. 
^ UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
BY!MARTHA PIERCE r I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI to: Paul Van Dam, 
Attorney General, and Sandra Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General, 
236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on this / l day of 
, , 1989, postage prepaid. 
15 
I:T A:rr ?zz SZZZITD DISTRICT JUVS:TILS CCUXT 
?C2 SALT LAJ3 COUNT!f STATS CF UTAH 
STATE 0? UTAH, In the i n t e r e s t o f 
D3AXZ, William DC3 ( 0 3 / 2 4 / 3 7 ) 
A person under e ighteen v e a r s o f age 
Case Ho. 734134 
WE222AS a Motion to Set Aside, Motion for New Hearing, Motion for 
Shelter Hearing and Motion for Restoration of Custody, filed for and on 
behalf of Christine Drake and William Mark Drake, natural parents of William 
Drake, came on for hearing before the above entitled Court on September 29, 
1937; and, 
WEZ2ZAS, Bruce Plenk, Esq,, and Jeffrey Burkhardt, Esq,, appeared and 
argued said Motions on behalf of the Petitioners, and Frederick Oddone, 
Chief Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, appeared and argued in opposition to 
said Motions on behalf of the State of Utah, Division of Family Services, 
and, 
WHZ2ZAS, the Court being fully advised in the premises, it hereby orders 
as follows: 
ORDER 
1. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 73-3a-45, 
the Motion to Set Aside the previous Order of Dismissal signed by 
this Court on September 14, 1937, is granted on the grounds that 
the issuing of said Order without notice to the parents and hearing 
may have significant effect en the alledged custodial rights of 
said parents, 
2. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 73-3a-46, 
the Motion for New Hearing in relation to said previous Order of 
Dismissal is granted to said parents on the grounds that new 
evidence as to the residence and domicile of the mother may be 
available which might effect said Order. 
3. The Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the previous Motion to 
Dismiss was not signed by a duly licensed attorney is denied on the 
grounds that the appropriate state attorney stood ready and willing 
to correct said omission on notification thereof. 
4. The Motion for New Shelter Hearing is denied on the grounds that • 
there appears no irregularity to the Court in the original shelter 
hearing and that the granting of such request for rehearing is 
discretionary vith the Court, (See Rules 3 & 13, UJCRPP). 
5. Tee Motions for Restoration of Custody and for an Order returning 
the child to the State of Utah are taken under advisement pending 
the new hearing herewith granted regarding the previous order of 
dismissal, it being anticipated by the Court that the respective 
parties will present evidence and/or argument at such hearing 
relevant to such issues to assist the Court in ruling thereon. 
APPENDIX 1-1 
<2) 
6. The Court takes under advisenent any ruling regarding application 
of the Unifora Child Custody Jurisdiction Act as argued by the 
petitioner pending further hearing. «g». 
Dated this 21st day of October . 1937. * sG*$0gg 
OCT: BY THE COURT **' 22 ]$QJ 
JUDGE F2AHXZYN B. KATEESOIT 
cc : Bruce Plenk, Esq. 
Jef frey Burkhardt, Esq. 
County Attorney 
Divis ion of Family Services 
ts/0524A 
APPENDIX 1-2 
S Z Z Z 21 "2 C13 T 21" C T J IT/ Z111 — Z C C u "ZT 
r:r A:D FC?. SALT LAKZ cccirrr 
no r r ? UTT r r I M 
A oe: *«• i ^ ^ a * !izr . t^en ^ ^ I T J of ag•• 
KZMC PJirrDUM D £ 3131C if 
Case 21 o .. n1 * J „, J J 
. A - - / Z J . 0 : : J . . J -X) I S o u i 
S t a t emen t of F a c t s 
u s u s : 1 ( 133: C h r i s t i n e Drake a r r i v e d In S a l : Laks CI:'/,, f":ta 
C a l i f o r n i a , SI 1 ; * r a / 4 i, a succession of addresses. 
lugus: 2^, 19;Si, Christine wan. delivered at a child j William Drake, 
at che K0I7 Cross Hospital in S 
3. August 25, 13irf , That Utah Division of Family Services waj 
contacted by authorities cf Holy Cross Hospital. The authorities 
expressed concern as to releasing the child from the Hospital with the 
mother, as the mother appeared unable to see to the proper care of the 
child. Trie mother vas released from the hospital The child was held. 
The evidence is contradictory as to whether the mother left the child in 
the hospital voluntarily pending securing of a piaca to live, or whether 
she was refused permission to take the chi^d from the hospital by a 
hospital worker. 
-;. August 31, 193*. Petition He. 7431 ^  alleging the child to be 
d^Dez>d<*z,z was filed with the Utah Juvenile Court by the Utah Division of 
Family Services. An Crier was issued giving temporary custody of the 
child to the Utah Agency. The child was released by the Hospital to Che 
Agency and placed by the Agency in shelter care. The Petition v.ir sec 
for hearing on November 2 „ 
i". September 1, 193"', \ shelter care hearing was held in the Utah 
Juvenile Court, A Commissioner found probable cause for the need of 
continued shelter care, and affirmed custody in the Agency for shelter 
care. The Commissioner set the matter for further review on September 9 
and gave authority to the Agency to release the child frnm shelter prior 
*. .j
 c %, „ (J » * A p^ j r <, <f i s r - e t i c n, 
6, S e p t e m b e r 2 , 1 9 3 7 . P e t i t i o n H o , b'J-;431 w a s file.i in L^e J u v e n i l e 
Court cf San Francisco County, California, alleging the child to be 
dependent and in need of supervision, together with a Request for Order 
of Detention. 
Jeptember A, 1337, /' • Drier of Dete 
Francio:.i Juvenile Court. af:e: hearin 
on was issued by the San 
g in that Court. 
V , -eptembe: 5, IJ37. I..e c;:iid was released by the Utah Agency worker 
from shelter to the physical custody of a San Francisco welfare worker 
for transportation of th? child fi 1 f[r «b to S?r Fr^cisco for placement. 
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9- September 14, 1937. A Motion for Dismissal of Utah Petition 74313-
vas filed in the Utah Juvenile Court by the Salt Lake County Attorney 
and an Order of Dismissal vas signed by a Juvenile Court Judge e:t-parte 
10. September 13, 1937. The natural parents of the child moved the Uta 
Juvenile court to set aside its previous Order of Dismissal and to gran 
a nev hearing in relation thereto, and asked for an Order restoring 
physical custody of the child to the parents and directing the return o 
the child to the State of Utah. 
11. September 29, 1937. Oral argument vas heard by the Utah Juvenile 
Court on the parent's Motion to set aside the previous Order of 
Dismissal. 
12. October 21, 1937. A Minute Entry and Order of the Utah Court 
setting aside its previous Order of Dismissal and granting a nev hearing 
vas entered. 
13. November 5, 1937. A legal Memorandum vas received from the parents 
in support of their Motion for restoration of custody. 
14. November 17, 1937. A legal Memorandum vas received from the State 
of Utah in support of dismissal and deference to California jurisdiction. 
15. November 13, 1937. After a hearing the Utah Juvenile Court found 
that California vas the more appopriate forum to determine and supervise 
custody of child, and issued <L Minute Order that the Utah Petition of 
August 31 be dismissed. 
B. Issue 
The basic operational i s s u e before the Court i s whether release of the 
chi ld by the Utah author i t ies to the State of California authori t ies vas 
appropriate and, i f not, whether the Utah Court should now attempt to secure 
the return of the child to Utah. The legal i ssue i s whether or not there i s 
any provision of lav which mandates restoration of Utah jur i sd i c t i on 
regarding said child and a s s e r t i o n thereof by the Utah Court. 
Decision 
1. It is the position of this Court that irrespective of the legal 
residence of the mother at the time of the birth of the child in Utah 
and without specifically finding in relation to that issue, that the 
Utah Juvenile Court had jin personam jurisdiction to intervene in the 
protection of the child (Utah Code Section 73-3a-24), and justification 
to do so especially in light of the apparent indigent circumstances of 
the mother and concerns expressed by the hospital attendants as to her 
ability to care for the child following birth. (See Section 
78-45c-3(c)). 
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2. It vas therefore appropriate for the Stat2 of Utah to intervene and 
take temporary physical custody of the child. Tie procedures fallowed 
v*re according to the previsions of the Utah Juvenile Court Act, 
Attempt vas cade to notify the 30tier as u cte hearing held to canfira 
placement of the child in shelter but her whereabouts could not be 
ascertaine-1 -sequencly, upon ier being located and before tie c±t: Id 
vas removed frra the State of Utah, she was given the opportunity to 
request a second shelter hearing which snze failed to do. Although tie 
Shelter Crier did in fact affirm and perpetuate tie separation of tie 
Bother from her chili, iu e process requirements were observed and tie 
Court finds no impropriety or inappropriate active in tie procedures 
followed by tie State Ager^v In assumirs; r-'p physical custod7» care and 
protection of tie ciild 
3, lie Juvenile CJU. - maj d-sai.** J, y- . ion ,and terminate tie 
proceedings relating to a child at any time if such action is in the 
interest of justice and the welfare of the child, Section 73-3a-23; 
Rule 22, UJCH??. Since it is the finding of the Court, as hereinafter 
set out, t.tat the State of California is the most appropriate and 
convenient forum to determine custody of the child, termination of tie 
Htih proceeding:! hi rh * Utah Juve:i:l> f:ur* is appropriate. 
4, Release of the ciild by the Utah agency to t.s California autorities 
1
 . not a "placement" of tie ciild by the Utah agency. The Utai agency 
-j.^ not attempting to arrange for the care of tie ciild in another 
jurisdiction or acting in the capacity cf a sending agency v::h 
intention of retaining jurisdiction over the child to determine matters 
relating to the custocy, care or control of the child. It vas 
understood that tne California authorities were assuming full 
responsibility of the child including cost of car-! with adyance 
k**J« ledge and under California Court Order. There vas, therefore, no 
"placement" outside of the State of Utah by the Utah Agency without Utai 
Court approval in violation of Section 73-3a-42(3) and no violation of 
the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (Section 55-3b~l 
et.seq). T;i3 Utah Agency in transferring the child to the California 
Agency, was acting under legal advice and t'le assumption, however 
incorrect the assumption might have been, that the State of California 
had custody jurisdiction cf the child at that time and that the State of 
Utai vas simply releasing any further custodial relationship witi tie 
child to a State having appropriate jurisdiction. There vas no willing 
or knowing attempt or intent to circumvent the lav, nor vas there any 
apparent conspiracy to take any action other than that in the best 
interest nc the chili. 
5. Counsel agree and t%e Courr cuncurs that the provisions of tha 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, adopted in both Utah and 
California, do apply in this case. Tie Court, having concluded that 
there vas no violation of any other applicable statute or inappropriate 
procsd ire followed by the Utah authorities, feels further that 
application of a- ! r i'. 1 1' *>J r*i sa1^ Art sioul I IDV determine resolu t.1 >n 
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the differences between the parties as to whether or ncc this Court 
ould assert Utah jurisdiciccn and Order return of the child to Utah. 
6. Tzz Court analyzes the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in ti 
concent of the instant case as follows: 
a. It is the general purpose of the Act to assure that litigation 
concerning the custody of a child takes place in the State with 
which the child and his fanily have the closest connection and 
where significant evidence concerning the care, protection, 
training and personal relationships is readily available. In ligh 
of the mother's previous prolonged residence in the State of 
California in coaparision with her very short presence in Utah, 
that the father of the child lives and works in California, that 
extended fanily members reside in that State, that custody 
proceedings are pending in that State regarding a sibling of the 
child, and that welfare and state agencies are most familiar with 
the fanily in that State, the child and fanily have a closer 
connection with the State of California and that this state should 
decline to enercise its jurisdiction. See 73-45c-l(c). 
b. Although this State nay be considered the "hone state" of the 
child at the tine of his birth, (Section 73-4Sc-2(5)), and that 
this State had jurisdiction to make a custody determination 
(Section 73-45c-3(l)(c)), California could likewise clain such 
jurisdiciton (Section 73-43c-3(l)(b)). The best interst of the 
child should be the determining factor. (Section 73-45c-3(l)(d)). 
b. The State of California nay have been precipitous in making a 
custody determination on September 4 in light of the Shelter Order 
of this Court of September 1 and the Petition for custody filed in 
this State on August 31 [Section 73-45c-5(l)] . Nonetheless, this 
Court may decline (dismiss) jurisdiction at any time before making 
a decree if it finds it is an inconvenient forum and that another 
state is a more convenient forum. Section 73-45c-7(i). 
d. It is the finding of this Court that California has a closer 
connection with the child and his family (73-43c-7(3)(b)) for the 
reasons enumerated under paragraph 6a and above, and that therefore 
that State is the more appropriate forum. 73-45c-7(l). 
e. Having so found this Court may dismiss the proceedings filed in 
this State. 73-45c-7(5). 
7. It is my conclusion that this Court may decline jurisdiction in this 
matter, dismiss the Utah proceedings, and that this Court is neither 
under compulsion to assert jurisdiction over the child nor to demand his 
return to the State of Utah. 
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Pecitioa auaber 743134 aa filed vitix tils Court can August 31, 1937 is 
tie i: "2by dismissed. 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
On November 18, 1987, the juvenile court, 
dismissed a pending state petition ruling that 
California was the more appropriate and 
convenient forum to determine custody of W. 
D. The natural parents of W. D. appeal the 
dismissal. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Prior to W. D.'s birth, Christine Drake and 
William Mick, W. D.'s natural parents, lived 
together in San Francisco, California. Drake 
had previously given birth to another child, I. 
D., in 1984 but California authorities had 
taken her into protective custody. Drake and 
Mick sought the return of the child so the 
California authorities, over a period of several 
years, conducted evaluations of the parents, 
administered placement programs, and were 
involved in court hearings with the parents. 
Following a hearing held on July 31, 1987, 
at which the California court recommended 
termination of parental rights in I. D., Drake 
left San Francisco and traveled to Salt Lake 
City. She was eight months pregnant with W. 
D. and came to Utah because she and Mick 
had decided that Utah law would allow them 
to retain custody of this child after its birth. 
Mick stayed behind in San Francisco. Drake 
arrived in Salt Lake City on August 1, 1987, 
bringing with her little money and few belon-
gings. For most of that month, she lived at 
various places within the city, including the 
women's shelter. 
On August 24, 1987 Drake delivered W. D. 
at Holy Cross Hospital. Two days later, Drake 
left the hospital, leaving W. D. behind. On 
August 31, after Drake had failed to visit W. 
D., a petition was filed with the juvenile court 
by the state. The petition alleged that W. D. 
was a dependent child and that California had 
jurisdiction over W. D., and was willing to 
adjudicate the 'infant's legal status if the 
infant is returned to California." An order of 
temporary custody, placing custody of W. D. 
with the Utah Division of Family Services 
("Family Services"), was issued by the court. 
A shelter hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3a-30 (Supp. 1988) was held the next 
day. However, the case worker was unable to 
find Drake to notify her of the hearing. As a 
result, custody was left with Family Services. 
The next day, September 2, Drake appeared, 
met with the case worker, and was informed 
about the shelter hearing. Drake refused to 
give her address and did not request another 
hearing. 
On these same facts, a petition was filed in 
California on September 3, which also alleged 
that W. D. was a dependant child. A hearing 
was held in San Francisco on September 4. 
Notice was given to both Drake and Mick, 
and Mick was present with counsel. Following 
the hearing, a detention order for W, D. was 
issued. On September 5, California officials 
flew to Salt Lake City, picked up W. D. from 
Family Services personnel, and returned with 
him to California. 
On September 12, Judge Matheson signed 
an ex parte order dismissing the case in Utah. 
Subsequently, Drake and Mick moved to set 
aside the dismissal. This motion was granted 
and a new hearing date set to consider the 
state's motion to dismiss. A hearing was held 
on the 5th and 18th of November 1987. 
During the hearing, each of the parents were 
represented by counsel and each side presented 
evidence and argument. At the conclusion, the 
court found that California was the more 
appropriate and convenient forum to deter-
mine custody, and granted the state's motion 
to dismiss the petition. 
The question before us is whether the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
("UCCJA"), Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-l to-
26 (1987), required the juvenile court to retain 
jurisdiction rather than defer to California as 
the more appropriate and convenient forum. 
DISCUSSION 
The parents first argue that California did 
not have any basis for jurisdiction over W. D. 
since Drake left before the child was born. 
Like Utah, California has adopted the 
UCCJA. Cal. Civil Code §5152 (West 1983). 
The pertinent provisions of these statutes are 
identical. They provide that a state court has 
jurisdiction to make or modify a child custody 
order if any of the following conditions are 
met: 
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(a) This state is che home state 
of the jhild JE the time or commc-
ncemenr of the proceeding . . 
(b) It is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state 
assume jurisdiction because ... the • 
child and his parents, or the child 
and at least one contestant, have a 
significant connection with this 
state, and ... there is available in 
this state substantial evidence con-
cerning the child's present or future 
care, protection, training, and per-
sonal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in 
this state and ... the child has been 
abandoned or ... it is necessary in 
an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or 
abuse or is otherwise neglected or 
dependent 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(Jl (IMS I* i nl 
Civil Code §5152 (West 1983). 
The statutes define "home state" as "the 
state in which the child immediately preceding 
the time involved lived with his parents, a 
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at 
least six consecutive months, and in the case 
of a child less than six months old the state in 
which the child lived from birth with any of 
the persons mentioned.* Utah Code Ann. §78-
45c-2(5)(t987); Cal. Civil Code §5151(5). 
Under this definition California fails to 
qualify as W. D.'s "home state." Utah may 
qualify as W, D.'s "home state" since he was 
born here, but problems arise in whether the 
child "lived from birth * with Drake and 
whether the state is a "person acting as 
parent." However, we need not decide that 
issue. Unlike the PKPA1 the Utah UCCM 
does not give a preference to the "hunit 
state." The significant connection or substan-
tial connection basis "comes into play either 
when the home state test cannot be met or as 
an alternative to that test. * 9 UCCJA 
(U.L.A.) §3 comment, 144 (1988) (emphasis 
added). Even though a certain state may be 
the "home state," if 'the child and his family 
have equal or stronger ties with another state" 
that other state also has jurisdiction. Id.; see 
also Smith v, Superior Court of San Mateo 
County, 68 Cal. App. 3d 457f 137 Cal. Rptr. 
348, 352 (1977). Therefore, the fact that Utah 
may technically have "home state* jurisdiction 
will not prevent California from also having 
jurisdiction under the "substantial connection" 
biMS 
In the instant case, Drake and Mick had 
lived in California for several years. W. D. 
was conceived and carried nearly to term 
there. At the time the petition in California 
wis filed, Mick was still living in San Franc-
isco2 and Drake had only left to find another 
27 
state with more favorable custody laws. Under 
these circumstances Drake, Mick and W. D. 
all had substantial connections with Califo-
rnia, thereby meeting the first requirement of 
the substantial connection test. Additionally, 
California authorities had information on the 
parents' mode of living, psychological 
makeup, marital relationship, parenting skills, 
and past interrelationship with W. D.'s older 
sister. This was Enough to meet the required 
need of substantial evidence on W. D.'s care, 
protection, training, and relationships to 
satisfy the scconji requirement. Although W. 
D had never been in California his physical 
presence "while desirable, [was] not a prereq-
uisite for jurisdiction to determine his 
custody." Cal. Civil Code §5152(3); sec also 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(3) (1987). 
California had jurisdiction to issue the deten-
tion order even before W. D. was transported 
to that state.3 
Alternatively, the paients ar^ue that amce a 
petition had been filed in Utah and a tempo-
rary custody order issued four days prior, the 
California court 'was not "exercising jurisdic-
tion substantially in conformity with this act* 
when it issued its detention order. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-6(l) (1987) 
limits the exercise of a courts jurisdiction 
under some circumstances* 
A court of Ithis state shall not exe-
rcise its jurisdiction under this act if 
Ji the time of filing the petition a 
proceeding concerning the custody 
of the child was pending in a court 
of another state exercising jurisdi-
ction substantially in conformity 
with this act, unless the proceeding 
is stayed by| the court of the other 
state because this state is a more 
appropriate forum or for other 
reasons 
California is bound by a similar pro*, man 
Cal Civil Code §5155(1) (West 1983), 
We reject the parents' interpretation of this 
section. The unilateral filing of a petition in 
one state does not prohibit the filing of a 
petition in another state which also has juris- . 
diction. Peterson v Peterson, 464 A.2d 202, 
205 (Me. 1983) But more importantly, the 
purpose of section 78-45c-6(l) "is to enco-
urage judicial restraint in exercising jurisdic-
tion whenever aiiother state appears to be in a 
better position to determine custody of a 
child." 9 UCCJA (U.L.A.) §7, comment, 234 
(1988). UItimate|y, it is""less important which 
court exercises jurisdiction but that courts of 
several states involved act in partnership to 
bring about the best possible solution for a 
child's future." 9 UCCJA (U.L.A.) prefatory 
note, 118 (1988) (emphasis added). Sec also 
Brokus v. Brokus, 420 N.E.2d 1242, 1247 
(Ind. App. 1981); Rex ford v, Rexford, 631 
P.2d 475, 479 (Alaska 1980). 
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Given this purpose, we will not quibble over 
the point at which one court or the other 
acquired priority-in-time jurisdiction. Had 
the courts both attempted to exercise contin-
uing jurisdiction over the matter, priority-in-
time would have been important. In re Guar-
dianship of Donaldson, 178 Cah App. 3d 477, 
223 Cai. Rptr. 707, 714 (Cah Ct. App. 1986). 
However, a court which has priority-in-time 
jurisdiction can 'yield jurisdiction" if another 
court is the more appropriate forum. Boden-
heimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdi-
ction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children 
Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1207,1231(1969). 
Finally, the parents argue that the court 
abused its discretion in determining that Cal-
ifornia was the more appropriate forum in 
which to litigate the custody of W. D. 
Just which forum is the most appropriate is 
determined by the best interests of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-7(3) (1987); Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-3(i)(b) (1987); Tuttle 
v. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Utah 
1981). See also Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382, 
383 (Utah 1987); Kelly v/ Drancy, 754 P.2d 
92, 95 (Utah App. 1988). Several factors may 
be taken inro account by the judge in deter-
mining best interests: 
(a) if another state is or recentl) 
was the child's home state; 
(b) if another state has a closei 
connection with the child and his 
family or with the child and one or 
more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concer-
ning the child's present or future 
care, protection, training, and per-
sonal relationships is more readily 
available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on 
another forum which is no less 
appropriate; and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by 
a court of this state would contra-
vene any of the purposes stated in 
§78-45c-l. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-7(3). 
Furthermore, "(although the child is the 
center o( attention in a custody proceeding, J 
the main inquiry is directed toward .... adults 
and toward making a prediction for the future 
concerning the superior ability of one of them 
to surround the child with the necessary sec-
urity, affection, and all other needs of a 
growing child." Bodenheimer, 22 Vand. L. 
Rev. at 1223. In the instant case, substantial 
information concerning the parents' abilities 
and past history was in California. The 
mother had only recently come to Utah, but 
had lived for years in California. Finally, the 
exposed purpose in coming to Utah was to 
shop for jurisdiction. 
Under these circumstances, we cannot say 
the judge abused his discretion in deciding that 
California had access to the greatest amount 
of relevant information, and so, in the best 
interests of the child, was the most appropr-
iate and convenient forum to litigate the 
custodv of W. D. 
We affirm. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 28 U.S.C.A. 
§1738A (West Supp. 1988). The PKPA does not 
apply to child neglect and dependency proceedings. 
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Avinger, 104 
N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290, 292 (1986), and so is not 
important to the resolution of this case. 
2. The facts and circumstance considered are those, 
in existence when the petition was filed. Rexford v. 
Rexford, 631 P.2d 475,478 (Alaska 1980). 
3. Although we cannot condone the manner in 
which W. O. was taken to California before Judge 
Matheson declined jurisdiction, nor the misstate: 
ment of information contained in the California 
petition, we believe the subsequent hearings prov-
ided the parents adequate due process to protect 
their rights. See in re Summers v. Wulffenstein, 616 
P.2d 608. 610 (Utah 1980). 
ORME, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
I concur in the substantive analysis set forth 
in the main opinion and agree with the conc-
lusion that the Utah court did not abuse its 
"discretion in deciding that California had 
access to the greatest amount of relevant inf-
ormation, and so, in the best interests of the 
child, was the most appropriate and conven-
ient forum to litigate the custody of W. D." I 
disagree only with the conclusion that dismi-
ssal of the Utah action was the appropriate 
means for implementing that decision. 
I believe the Utah court erred in dismissing 
the petition filed with it rather than simply 
staying the proceeding as authorized in Utah 
Code Ann. §73-45c-7(5) (1987).» Events 
were simply too unsettled to warrant outright 
dismissal. The Utah proceeding should have 
been kept alive pending further clarification of 
the .situation: Would Drake remain in Utah 
and establish a legitimate residence here, or 
would she return to California? Would Mick 
stay on in California or join Drake in Utah? 
If Mick came to Utah, would California in 
fact retain jurisdiction.over W.-D. since W. D. 
was born in Utah and was still in Utah when 
the California petition was filed?2 
Indeed, as it happened, Mick joined Drake 
in Utah, the two are enrolled in parenting 
classes, W. D. has been placed in a shelter 
home here, and Utah social workers are assi-
sting with the transition to unification of the 
family-but all under the supervision of a 
California court. Had the action here been 
kept alive, the Utah court would have been in 
a position to monitor the situation and could 
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have reactivated the Utah proceeding after it 
became apparent that Utah actually would 
have the greatest interest in W, D. arid his 
family. 
Conceding that, all things considered, Cal-
ifornia may have initially seemed the sensible 
forum to exercise jurisdiction, nonetheless, the 
Utah court should have merely stayed the 
proceeding before it rather than dismissing it 
outright. I would vacate the order of dismi-
ssal, remand with instructions to enter an 
order merely staying the Utah proceeding, and 
thereby permit Utah, on appropriate motion, 
to reassert jurisdiction over this Utah family. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Section 73-4,5c-7(5) provides with in:; • anph 
asis: 
If the court Finds that it is an inconve 
nient forum and that a court of another 
state is a more appropriate forum, it 
may dismiss the proceedings, or it may 
stay the proceedings upon condition that 
a custody proceeding be promptly 
commenced in another named state or upon 
any other conditions wfyjcJi may be 
just and proper, including the condition 
that a moving party stipulate his consent 
and submission to the jurisdiction of the 
other forum. 
2. The California petition falsely recited, 
under penalty of perjury, that W. D. 
was in emergency custody in California 
when the petition was filed there oh 
September 4, 1987. However, Mick'act* 
ended the hearing on the petition held 
that same day, with counsel. The actual 
facts fortunately emerged at the hearing 
and the California court made its deci-
sion, fully informed of the fact that W% 
D. was actually in Utah at the time. 
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(Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration m the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the pnvileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive amy person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec . 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law 1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people. iao* 
APPENDIX 4 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms 
and snail not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child 
custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a 
court of another State. 
(b) As used in this section, the ter m— 
f I) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen; 
"contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to 
:7 o r visitation of a child; 
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a 
mur* providing for the custody or visitation of a child,,, and includes permanent 
•• mporary orders, and initial orders and modifications; 
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time 
involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent; 
for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six 
months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of such 
persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as 
part of the six-month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determination" whi :h 
modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a pi i ::n 
custody determination concerning the same child, whether made by the sam i 
court or not; 
(6) "person acting .as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has 
physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court 
or claims a right to custody; 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child; and 
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States. 
(c) A child custody ce^ , - -
provisions of this section only ,f~-
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State 
within six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding 
and the child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention 
by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to' live in 
such State; 
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under 
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best! interest of the child that a court of 
such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the 
child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such 
State other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is 
available in such State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; 
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been 
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse; 
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under 
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the 
more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in 
the best interest of the child that sucth court assume jurisdiction; or 
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this 
-•^tion. 
jurisdiction of a court, of a State which has made a child custody 
1
 jn consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as 
tne requirement of subsection (c) (1) of this section continues to be met and such 
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant 
(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable notice and opportuni-
ty to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose ] ights 
h.v-e not been previously terminated and any person who has physic ' of a 
(0 A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody o: child 
-;i-'e by a court of another State, if— 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to 
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a 
custody determination commenced during the pendbney of a proceeding in a court of 
another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consist-
ently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination 
(Added Pub.L. 96-611, § 3(a), Dec. 23, 19S0, 94 Stat. 3569.) 
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7S-3a-l. Juvenile court — Purposes — Jurisdic-
tion. 
The juvenile court is estabhsned as a forum for the 
resolution ot all matters proDeriv brougnt before itT 
consistent with appucaole constitutional and statu-
tory requirements of due process The court has the 
jurisdiction, powers, and duties under this chapter to. 
(1) promote public safety and individual ac-
countability by the imposition of appropriate 
sanctions on persons who have committed acts in 
violation of law, 
(2) wnere approonate, order rehabilitation, 
reeducation, and treatment for persons who have 
committed act3 bringing them within the court's 
jurisdiction. 
(3) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, 
neglected* and dependent children and to provide 
care and protection for these children by place-
ment, protection, and custody orders; 
(4/ adjudicate matters that relate to children 
who are beyond parental or adult control and to 
estaolish appropriate authority over these chil-
dren by means of placement and control orders; 
(5) order appropriate measures to promote 
guidance and control, preferably in the child's 
own home, as an aid m the prevention of future 
unlawful conduct and the development of respon-
sible citizenship 
(6) remove a child from parental custody only 
where the minor's safety or welfare, or the public 
3afety, may not otherwise be adequately safe-
guarded, and 
(7) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to 
act in the best interests of the children in all 
cases and attempt to preserve and strengthen 
family ties wnere possible i^sa 
7S-45o-l. Purposes — Construction, 
(1) The general purposes of this act are to 
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict 
with courts of other states in matters of child 
custodv which have in the past resulted m the 
shifting of children from state to state with 
harmful effects on their well-being, 
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of 
other states to the end that a custody decree is 
rendered in that state which can best decide the 
case m the interest of the child, 
(c) assure that litigation concerning the cus-
todv of a child take place ordinarily in the state 
with which the child and his family have the 
closest connection and where significant evidence 
concerning hi3 care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships is most readily available, 
and that c&MYta ol xh\s stata decime the exercise 
of jurisdiction wnen the child and his family have 
a closer connection with another state, 
(d) discourage continuing controversies over 
child custodv in the interest of greater stability 
of aome env ironment and of secure family rela-
tionships for the child, 
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral re-
moval* of children undertaken to obtain custody 
awards, 
(f) avoid relitigation of custody decisions of 
other states in this state insofar as feasible, 
(g facilitate the enforcement of custody de-
crees of other states, 
(h) promote and expand the exchange of infor-
mation and other forms of mutual assistance be-
tween the courts of this state and those of other 
states concerned with the same child, and 
(0 to make uniform the law of those states 
which enact it 
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the gen-
eral purposes stated in this section i980 
73-45c 2. Definitions. 
As used in this act 
(I) 'Contestant* mears a person, including a 
parent who claims a ngnt to custodv or visita-
tion rights with resoet-t to a child, 
< 2) 'Custodv determination * means a court de-
cision and court orders and instructions provid-
ing for the custodv of a child, including visitation 
ngnt3, it does not include a decision relating to 
child support or any other monetary obligation of 
any person, 
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings 
m which a custody determination is one of sev-
eral issues, 3uch as an action for dissolution of 
mamage, or legal separation, and includes child 
neglect and dependency proceedings, 
(4) "Decree * or 'custody decree' means a cus-
tody determination contained in a judicial decree 
or order made in a custody proceeding, and in-
cludes an initial decree and a modification de-
cree, 
(5) "Home state * means the state in which the 
child immediately preceding the time involved 
lived with his parents, a parent, or a person act-
ing as parent, for at least six consecutive months, 
and m the case of a child less than 3ix months old 
the state in which the child lived from birth with 
any of the persons mentioned Periods of tempo-
rary absence of any of the named persons are 
counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(6) "Initial decree * means the first custody de-
cree concerning a particular child, 
(7) 'Modification decree * means a custody de-
cree which modifies or replaces a prior decree, 
whether made by the court which rendered the 
prior decree or by another court, 
(8) "Physical custody' means actual possession 
and control of a child, 
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, 
other than a parent, who has physical custody of 
a child and who has either been awarded custody 
by the court or claims a right to custody; and 
(10) "State' means any state, territory or pos-
session of the United States, the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia 
1980 
78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. 
(1) A court of this state which is competent to de-
cide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a 
child custody determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the fol-
lowing paragraphs are met 
(a) This state d) is the home state of the child 
at the time of commencement of the proceeding, 
or (n) had been the child's home state within six 
months before commencement of the proceeding 
and the child is absent from this state because of 
his removal or retention by a person claiming his 
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or per-
son acting as parent continues to live in this 
state, 
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a 
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (l) 
the child and his parents or the child and at 
least one contestant, have a significant connec-
tion with this state, and (n) there is available in 
this state substantial evidence concerning the 
child s present or future care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships, 
(c) The child is physically present in this state 
and d) the child has been abandoned or (n) it is 
6 - 1 
i—ioe-- ^ . - r riuuc: of petitioner as basis for 
* ** -.n4 jurisdiction — Nonce to an-
1
 v - jurisdiction —• Ordering peti-
:o appear in other court or to 
\ child — Awarding costs. 
(Dlfthep* • .-r for an initial decree has wrong-
IIv taken tne :n..d from another state or has en-
n similar reprehensible conduct the court may 
n exercise jurisdiction for purposes of adjudi-
f :his is just and proper under the 
i2^ Unless required in the interest of the child, the 
-"-* « - " noc exercise its jurisdiction to modify a 
ee of another state if the petitioner, with-
•>*" *'""* person entitled to custody has im-
child from the physical custody 
;
 A custody or has improperly 
i visit or other temporary 
"istody. If the petitioner 
* a custody decree of 
notner state .e <^~ — Ane to exercise its 
irisdiction if this is just and proper under the cir 
umstances. 
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdic-
ion upon petition for an initial custody decree pursu-
nt to Subsection (1), the court shall notify the parent 
r other appropriate person and the prosecuting at-
orney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other 
tate. If a request to that effect is received from the 
ither state, the court shall order the petitioner to 
ippear with the child in a custody proceeding insti-
uted in the other state in accordance with Section 
r8-45c-2Q. If no such request is made within a reason-
le time after such notification, the court, may enter-
in,, a petition to determine custody by the petitioner 
it has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-2... 
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction 
modify the custody decree of another state pursu-
it to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section 
i-4oc-14, the court shall notify the person who has 
gal custody under the decree of the other state and 
e prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdic-
)n in the other state and may order the petitioner to 
turn the child to the person who has legal custody. 
it appears that the order will be ineffective and the 
gal custodian is ready to receive the child within a 
triod of a few days, the court may place the child in 
foster care home for such period, pending return of 
le child to the legal custodian. At the same time, the 
iurt shall advise the petitioner that any petition for 
.odification of custody must be directed to the appro-
bate court of the other state which has continuing 
irisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines 
irisdiction. to a court in a state which has jurisdic-
on pursuant to Section 73-45c-3. 
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a peti-
on under this section may charge the petitioner 
itk necessary travel and other expenses, including 
ttor riey's fees and the cost of returning the child to 
neither state. i960 
7S«45c-!}. Information as to custody of child and 
litigation concerning required in 
pleadings — Verification — Continu-
ing duty to inform court. 
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first 
pleading or ih an affidavit attached to that pleading 
shall give information under oath as to the child'3 
present address, the places where the child has lived 
within the iak five years, and the names and present 
addresses of the persons with whom the child has 
lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavit 
every party phall further declare under oath as to 
each of the following whether 
(a) he has participated, as a party, witness, or 
in any other capacity, in any other litigation con-
cerning ihe custody of the same child in. this or 
any othe r^ state; 
(b) he has information of any custody proceed-
ing concerning the child pending in a court of 
this or a^y other state; and 
(c) he jknows of any person not a party to the 
proceedings who has physical custody of the child 
or claims to have custody or visitation rights 
with respect to the child. 
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items is 
in the affirmative the declarant shall give additional 
information linder oath as required by the court. The 
court may examine the parties under oath as to de-
tails of the information furnished and as to other 
matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the 
disposition of the case. 
(3) Each par ty has a continuing duty to inform the 
court of any custody proceeding concerning the child 
in this or an I other s ta te of which he obtained infor-
mation dur ing this proceeding. 1980 
78- 45c 14, Modification of foreign decree — 
Prerequisites — Factors considered. 
(1) If a court of another state has made a custod) 
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that de-
cree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state that 
the court which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with this act or has de-
clined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and 
(b) the {court of this state has jurisdiction. 
(2) If la court of this s ta te is authorized under Sub-
section (1) and Section 78-45c-8 to modify a custody 
decree of another s t a t e it shall give due consideration 
to the transcript of the record and other documents of 
all previous proceedings submit ted to it in accordance 
with Section 78-45c-22. 1980 
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ne-essarv m an ^mer-ency to protect -.he cmld 
because r.e has been suojected to or threatened 
wi:a mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise ne-
glected or deoendent; or 
id* »u It aDpears that no other state would 
have jurisdiction under prerequisites substan-
tial! v in accordance with Paragraphs 'a;, (b), or 
<c;. or another state has declined to exercise juns-
diction on the ground that thi* state is the more 
approDnate forum to determine the custody of 
the child, and <ii) it is in the best interest of the 
child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
(2) Exceot under Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Subsec-
tion (1), phvsical presence in this state of the child, or 
of the child and one of the contestants, isnot alone 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state 
to make a child custody determination. 
(3) Phvsical oresence of the child, while desirable, 
is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his 
custody. 1 9 8 0_ 
78-4oc-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Ju-
risdiction not exercised — Inquiry to 
other state — Information exchange — 
Stay of proceeding on notice of an-
other proceeding. 
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its juris-
diction under this act if at the time of filing the peti-
tion a proceeding concerning the custody of the child 
was pending in a court of another state exercising 
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act, 
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the 
other 3tate because this state is a more appropriate 
forum or for other reasons. 
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody pro-
ceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and 
other information supplied by the parties under Sec-
tion 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody reg-
istry established under Section 78-45c-16 concerning 
the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child 
in other 3tates. If the court has reason to believe that 
proceedings may be pending in another state it 3hail 
direct an inquiry to the 3tate court administrator or 
other appropriate official of the other state. 
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the 
proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody 
of the child was pending in another state before the 
court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceed-
ing and communicate with the court in which the 
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue 
may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and 
that information be exchanged in accordance with 
Sections 73-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of 
this 3tate has made a custody decree before being 
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of an-
other state it shall immediately inform that court of 
the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding 
was commenced in another state afler it assumed ju-
risdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to 
the end that the issues may be litigated in the more 
appropriate forum. 1980 
73-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on rinding of in-
convenient forum — Factors in deter-
mination — Communication with other 
court — Awarding costs. 
( D A court which has jurisdiction under this act to 
make an initial or modification decree may decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a de-
cree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to 
make a custody determination under the circum-
stances of the case and that a court of another state is 
a more appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made 
upon the court'3 own motion or upon motion of a 
party or a guardian ad litem or other representative 
of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, 
the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the 
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this 
purpose it may take into account the following fac-
, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was the 
child'3 home state; 
(b) if another state has a closer connection 
with the child and his family or with the child 
and one or more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships is more readily 
available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum 
which is no less appropriate: and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of 
this state would contravene any of the purposes 
stated in Section 78-45c-l. 
Before determining whether to decline or retain 
diction the court may communicate with a court 
mother state and exchange information pertinent 
e assumption of jurisdiction by either court with 
w to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised 
«/ the more appropriate court and that a forum will 
be available to the parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient 
forum and that a court of another state is a more 
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or 
it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a 
custody proceeding be promptly commenced in an-
other named 3tate or upon any other conditions which 
may be just and proper, including the condition that a 
moving party stipulate his consent and submission to 
the jurisdiction of the other forum. 
(6) The court may decline to exercise it3 jurisdic-
tion under this act if a custody determination is inci-
dental to an action for divorce or another proceeding 
while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other 
proceeding. 
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an 
inappropriate forum it may require the party who 
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the 
costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel 
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, in-
curred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is 
to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to 
the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under 
this section the court shall inform the court found to 
be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the 
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state 
is not certainly known, shall transmit the informa-
tion to the court administrator or other appropriate 
official for forwarding to the appropriate court. 
(9) Any communication received from another 
state informing this state of a finding of inconvenient 
forum because a court of this state is the more appro-
priate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of 
the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction 
the court of this state shall inform the original court 
of this fact. 1980 
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